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Sending the Self-Execution Doctrine to the 
Executioner 
Aya Gruber* 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Ginsburg, our inestimable keynote speaker, stated else-
where that “[n]ational, multinational and international human rights 
charters and tribunals today play a key part in a world with increa-
singly porous borders,” such that “[w]e are the losers if we do not both 
share our experience with, and learn from others.”1  In this day and 
age, internationalism is simply unavoidable.  The years following 9/11 
saw international law and the law of armed conflict rise to the fore-
front of our legal and national consciousness.  Terms like “Geneva 
Conventions,” “war crimes,” and “international human rights” be-
came entrenched in the American political vocabulary.2  Indeed, the 
past few terms of the Supreme Court involved several cases touching 
upon issues of international law and norms.3  Recently, much has been 
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my deepest gratitude to the organizers of the FIU Inauguration Symposium, “The Intersection 
of United States Constitutional Law with International and Foreign Law,” my fellow symposium 
participants, Harold Koh, Erwin Chemerinsky, Anthony D’Amato, Drew Days, III, Christopher 
Edley, Jr., Francisco Valdes, Elizabeth Foley, Stanley Fish, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as 
well as the Dean, faculty, and administration of the FIU College of Law.  In particular, I wish to 
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1 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond our Borders: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329 (2004). 
 2 See, e.g., John Mintz, On Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary; Most Experts Say Al 
Qaeda Members Aren’t POWs but Taliban Fighters Might Be, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A22; 
Paisley Dodds, U.S. Legislators Visiting Guantánamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 25, 2002; Katha-
rine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Prisoners; Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held 
in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A10.  See Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot 
Acts: Rights and Duties in the Worst of Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242, 265 (2006) 
(noting that “[t]he press, including the international press . . . has run critical stories about al-
leged abuse and/or torture of suspected terrorists in Iraqi prisons and at Guantánamo, violations 
of the Geneva Convention”).   
 3 See Beth Van Schaack, International Law in the United States Legal System: Observance, 
Application, and Enforcement, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 807 (2005) (“[S]tarting with the Court’s 
2002 Term, the quality and quantity of Supreme Court cases touching on international law has 
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made of the Court’s burgeoning internationalism, rendering the topic 
a subject of frequent academic and popular discussion.4  Some rejoice 
at observations, like Justice Ginsburg’s, that the Court’s “‘island’ or 
‘lone ranger’ mentality is beginning to change.”5  Others decry the 
influence of foreign law and values on American domestic law as a 
precursor to total loss of sovereignty.6  Yet others feel that the Su-
preme Court’s newly-minted commitment to international law may be 
more show than substance.7 
Claims of the Supreme Court’s increasing awareness and integra-
tion of international consensus and norms appear vindicated by deci-
sions like Roper v. Simmons,8 which incorporates international opinion 
into the “evolving standards of decency” analysis of juvenile execu-
tion.9  The argument that the Supreme Court is still not fulfilling its 
potential as a validator of international law is supported by cases like 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,10 in which the Court interpreted the Alien 
Torts Claims Act to permit private claims under federal common law 
for violations of customary international law, but defined customary 
international law narrowly with reference to the law of nations in 1789 
(the year the Act was passed).11   
In this Essay, I contend the Supreme Court can never truly aban-
don its “island” mentality until it is willing to reaffirm the status of 
treaties as supreme federal law in the face of anti-internationalist low-
                                                                                                                           
significantly raised the visibility of [the international law] tradition on the bench, in the academy, 
in the press, and among members of the general public.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Jordan Paust, International Law Before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of 
Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 829 (2005); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the Ameri-
can Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invoca-
tions of Foreign and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 507 (2006); Mark Weston Janis, 
The American Tradition of International Law: Exceptionalism and Universalism, 21 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 211, 212 (2006); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 291 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 46 (2004); John O. McGinnis, Contemporary Foreign International Law in Constitu-
tional Construction, 69 ALB. L. REV. 801 (2006); Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diploma-
cy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 285–86 (2006). 
 5 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 335. 
 6 See, e.g., Kochan, supra note 4, at 507 (asserting that “[t]his trend is inappropriate, un-
democratic, and dangerous”).  See also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 329 (describing inter-
national law as product of “global networks” of elites that threatens “national sovereignty”).     
 7 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 4, at 855 (noting that in 2004 term, Supreme Court viewed 
international law “obliquely” and often used it merely to supplement domestic construction). 
 8 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 9 Id. at 554. 
 10 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 11 Id. at 732.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 288 (explaining that in Sosa, “Justice Souter 
carefully avoids identifying any rules of customary international law that do meet the standards 
of wide acceptance and definite content necessary for new causes of action in ATS cases” and 
“adds numerous other caveats and considerations”). 
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er decisions that have created a super-charged self-execution doctrine.  
The self-execution doctrine is a judicial invention12 holding that a trea-
ty only provides judicially-enforceable rights if it “operates of itself” 
or if Congress implements it through specific legislation.13  Over the 
past forty years, lower courts have substantially narrowed the class of 
treaties that operate of themselves and created a presumption of do-
mestic unenforceability.14  Unless the Supreme Court is willing to 
sound the death knell of the modern self-execution doctrine, it cannot 
truly embrace the value of international law.  Recently, the Court had 
two very good opportunities to declare the Geneva Conventions15 self-
executing in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,16 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.17  Unfor-
tunately, the Court went to great lengths to avoid the self-execution 
issue, even though a resolution of the question of Geneva self-
execution was clearly called for.  
This Essay is an exhortation to the Court to take up the treaty 
self-execution issue and finally push back the rising tide of isolation-
ism in the doctrine created by lower courts exhibiting a basic skeptic-
ism of international law.  Part I of the Essay discusses the pervasive 
force of modern isolationist philosophies.  It also examines the move-
ment of the Court, or at least individual Justices, away from this phi-
losophy.  Part II examines the history of the self-execution doctrine 
and shows how it has morphed from a fairly straightforward contract-
based doctrine into a mechanism that thwarts the enforceability of 
valid federal law, merely because it is set forth in an international in-
strument.  Finally, Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s stand on self-
execution, noting the paucity of recent cases on the doctrine, and 
maintains that the Court should have taken the opportunity to discuss 
self-execution in the terrorism detention decisions. 
I.  ISOLATIONISM & INTERNATIONALISM 
Professor Mark Westin Janis, states: 
Crafting an international law that weaves the nations to-
gether while not dismissing their genuine and healthy di-
versity is a real challenge. In a word, American interna-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Jordan J. Paust, Self–Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 766 (1988) (characte-
rizing self–execution doctrine as judicial invention). 
 13 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
 14 See infra notes 112–30 and accompanying text. 
 15 By “Geneva Conventions” and “Geneva,” I refer primarily to the Third Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter “Third Geneva Convention”].  
 16 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 17 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
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tional lawyers need to translate international law univer-
salism to America’s exceptionalists, and to translate Amer-
ican international law exceptionalism to international law’s 
universalists.18 
To be sure, the question of isolation versus internationalism is a 
difficult one, as is the more abstract issue of universal human rights 
versus cultural values.19  On one hand, isolationism is closely asso-
ciated with xenophobia, hostility to human rights, and the rejection of 
civilized advancement.20  On the other hand, not even the most ardent 
internationalist would assert that international law should transplant 
all domestic legislation or that foreign countries’ traditions should 
completely displace American values.21  Recently, in the legal academy, 
analysis of U.S. isolationism has given way to extensive discussion of a 
related phenomenon, American exceptionalism.22  Loosely,23 exceptio-
nalism denotes the United States’ Janus-faced stance on international 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Janis, supra note 4, at 212. 
 19 See generally Michel Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between Universal-
ism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249 (1999) (deconstructing perceived relativism–universalism irre-
concilability). 
 20 Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam criticizes constitutional law scholars for failing to 
“enshrine the most enlightened and progressive ideals of the community of nations” because of a 
prevalent “[i]solationist thinking bred of the comfortable, cocky myth of American exceptional-
ism.”  Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A. 
Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
403 (2004).  See also Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 68 
(2006) (“American Exceptionalism can carry connotations of xenophobia or downright lawless-
ness.”) (footnote omitted). 
 21 Justice Scalia states, “What’s going on here? Do you want [international law] to be 
authoritative? I doubt whether anybody would say, ‘Yes, we want to be governed by the views of 
foreigners.’  Well if you don’t want it to be authoritative, then what is the criterion for citing it 
not [sic]? That it agrees with you?”  See Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Constitution-
al Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (Discussion at the American University 
Washington College of Law), transcript available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/ 
mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0? 
OpenDocument [hereinafter Scalia–Breyer debate]. 
 22 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Harold Honju Koh, On Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1513–15 (2003). Mark B. Rotenberg notes that “[t]he 
Bush administration’s response to the attacks of 9/11 . . . has revived exceptionalism as a leading 
theme for American politicians, social commentators, and international critics alike.”  Mark B. 
Rotenberg, America’s Ambiguous Exceptionalism, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 188, 188–89 (2005). 
 23 Given that this Essay is not generally about deconstructing the concept of isolationism 
and American exceptionalism, I use these terms quite loosely to describe hostility to the domes-
tic influence of international and foreign laws and norms.  In this sense, I must admit that I am 
readily subject to Dean Koh’s criticism that “the term ‘American exceptionalism’ has been used 
far too loosely and without meaningful nuance.”  Koh, supra note 22, at 1482. 
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law.24  One face of the United States touts itself as a leader in interna-
tional human rights, engages in humanitarian and not-so-humanitarian 
military campaigns in the name of the rule of law, and signs interna-
tional human rights treaties.25  The other face holds that the United 
States ought to be exempt from international rules of law and uses 
legal mechanisms to undermine the enforcement of treaties.26  Al-
though the faces of American exceptionalism may appear inconsistent, 
there is a reconciling principle.  Exceptionalism describes the tenden-
cy of the U.S. to view itself as a creator and validator of first legal 
principles.27  Thus, internationalism is useful only to the extent that it 
helps the exportation of American-ness, but not for any internaliza-
tion of foreign principles.28 
While this Essay does not seek to present an exhaustive critique 
of isolationism or exceptionalism, I will advance a normative argu-
ment against the prevailing isolationist philosophy.  In its best light, 
exceptionalism has a couple of apparently positive aspects:  First, the 
United States’ promotion of “American” values, while certainly sub-
ject to criticism, can potentially further the rule of law and human 
rights.29  Our distinguished symposium participant Dean Harold Koh 
notes that “the best face of American exceptionalism proves to be the 
face that promotes the rule of law.”30  Second, as Professor Janis as-
serts, exceptionalism can protect “genuine and healthy diversity.”31  
The first benefit of exceptionalism, while not all-together uncontro-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Koh, supra note 22, at 1482–83.  President Bush is an exceptionalist in the sense that 
on one hand, he claims to embrace principles of international law, and on the other hand, he 
refuses to be constrained by those laws.  See Philippe Sands QC, Lawless World? The Bush Ad-
ministration and Iraq: Issues of International Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 295, 301 (2006) (describing Bush’s “a la carte multilateralism”). 
 25 The negative aspect is America’s aggressive military interventionism, while the positive 
is America’s “exceptional global leadership and activism.”  Koh, supra note 22, at 1487. 
 26 See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND 
ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001) (“American exceptionalism has always had two sides: the 
one eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message 
should be ignored.”); Resnik, supra note 22, at 1582 (noting that some take exceptionalism as 
license for unilateralism); Koh, supra note 22, at 1482–83 (asserting that one face of exceptional-
ism is hostility to international law, including valid treaty law). 
 27 See Resnik, supra note 22, at 1582–83 (“For some, as the exceptional nation, America 
should be a ‘model . . . with a special and unique destiny to lead the rest of the world to freedom 
and democracy.’”) (quoting INTRODUCTION TO IMAGINED HISTORIES: AMERICAN HISTORIANS 
INTERPRET THE PAST 4 (Anthony Molho & Gordon S. Wood eds., 1998)). 
 28 See Koh, supra note 22, at 1497–98 (criticizing America’s double standard approach to 
international law). 
 29 While it is suspect for the United States to impose its version of the rule of law through 
military force, America’s role as a moral and financial supporter of human rights and the rule of 
law is less problematic.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 30 Koh, supra note 22, at 1494. 
 31 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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versial, is not a product of isolationism but of involvement in world 
affairs, albeit in an incredibly one-sided way.32  Consequently, the 
second perceived benefit is more germane to this Essay.  The idea is 
that in order to protect its democratic values and even sovereignty, the 
United States must erect barriers to the influence of international 
laws and norms.33  Otherwise, there will be only one set of “world” 
values and the international community will be devoid of its “healthy 
diversity.”34 
Indeed, the idea that accepting international law will destroy 
American values and autonomy is continually emphasized by con-
servative scholars and Supreme Court justices.35  Dean Koh explains 
that this philosophy enables a “nationalist jurisprudence,” in which 
foreign law is considered “irrelevant, or worse yet, an impermissible 
imposition on the exercise of American sovereignty.”36  Conservative 
Court members consistently repeat the mantra that international con-
sensus and decisional law have no place in American jurisprudence.37  
The argument behind this conclusion is the hyperbolic assertion that 
consideration of international values and law will lead to the utter 
displacement of American law.38  The quite obvious problem with this 
stance is that the premise of the argument does not support its conclu-
sion.  If the concern is a total loss of sovereignty, what follows is that 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Hence the criticism is that even if American imperialism promotes the rule of law, it is a 
priori illegitimate to impose norms in a culturally monopolistic way.  See supra note 26. 
 33 See John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 327 (2006) 
(criticizing Court “for relying on international and foreign law, whose production process cannot 
be easily understood, let alone influenced, by the average citizen”). 
 34 Former ABA President Frank Holman, architect of the Bricker Amendment, which 
sought to make treaties presumptively invalid, see infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text, 
justified the Amendment as marking the “line . . . between those Americans who believe in the 
preservation of national sovereignty and national independence and those who believe that our 
national independence . . . should yield to international considerations and some kind of world 
authority.”  See FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 22 (1954). 
 35 See, e.g., infra note 37 (statements by Justices Scalia and Thomas); Roger P. Alford, Misus-
ing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2004) (“Using global 
opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically undermines sovereignty.”). 
 36 Koh, supra note 4, at 52. 
 37 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (calling consideration of other 
nations’ opinions on death penalty “totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the funda-
mental beliefs of this Nation”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(same); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(stating that “this Court ... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans”). 
 38 See e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 879 (2004). 
(calling the internationalist “a rudderless person in search of a fundamental identity [who] may 
well find himself or herself in the comfort of zealotry and the community of terror”); Joan L. 
Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehn-
quist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1320–21 (2004) (arguing that incorporation has potential to reverse entire 
constitutional structure). 
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domestic law should place some justifiable limits on the influence of 
international law and norms in order to preserve domestic autonomy.39  
This is, however, precisely not the argument that conservative Court 
members make - they argue for a total elimination of international 
influence.   
Take, for example, the internationalism-isolationism debate that 
played out in Roper v. Simmons.40  The majority undertook a classic 
two-pronged “evolving standards of decency” examination to reject 
the continuing vitality of juvenile executions.41  This analysis consisted 
of a determination of the “national consensus” regarding juvenile ex-
ecution42 and the “Court’s own judgment.”43  The Court determined 
that consensus evidence established a national trend against juvenile 
death penalty.44  Examining its own judgment, the Court cited socio-
logical studies demonstrating that juveniles are not the “worst” of-
fenders.45  International consensus played the very limited role of 
“confirming” the Court’s own judgment that juvenile execution vi-
olated civilized standards, which itself only came into play after de-
termining national consensus.46   
Justice Scalia, in dissent, however, characterized “the basic pre-
mise of the Court’s argument” as holding “that American law should 
conform to the laws of the rest of the world.”47 It is this premise Scalia 
contends “ought to be rejected out of hand.”48  Justice Scalia sets up a 
false dichotomy in which either international law counts for nothing 
or it totally usurps American values.49  He states, “I do not believe that 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable limits on the do-
mestic enforceability of treaties); see also David Sloss, Non–Self–Executing Treaties: Exposing a 
Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (asserting that 19th century self–
execution cases struck appropriate balance between competing rule of law and separation of 
powers principles). 
 40 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 41 Roper, 543 U.S. at 561; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion) 
(creating evolving standards of decency test). 
 42 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–68. 
 43 Id. at 568–75. 
 44 Id. at 564–68. 
 45 Id. at 569–75. 
 46 Id. at 575–78.  The Court states, “Our determination that the death penalty is dispropor-
tionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United 
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty.”  Id. at 575. 
 47 Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 48 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Under this construction, either the citation of interna-
tional law entails total deference or it is just “meaningless dicta.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Kenneth Anderson argues that prior to Roper it was possible 
to believe that international law was just Stevens’ and Breyer’s “hobbyhorse,” but after the 
decision, we should be concerned about the viability of basic American values.  He states: 
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approval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should buttress our commit-
ment to American principles any more than (what should logically 
follow) disapproval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken 
that commitment.”50  Although displacement of U.S. law is the pur-
ported reason behind Scalia’s conclusions that international values 
should never be mentioned, there is obviously a deeper isolationism at 
work.  Justice Scalia’s xenophobia rears its ugly head when he moves 
away from apocalyptic claims about foreign law taking over and dis-
cusses why foreign norms are inappropriate for even passing consid-
eration.  Justice Scalia takes pains to contrast our “centuries-old 
American” legal tradition with that of countries with “tyrannical polit-
ical makeup[s]” and “subservient or incompetent . . . court system[s].”51 
Conservative supporters of treaty non-self-execution suffer the 
same predicament when arguing signed and ratified treaties should 
not be the “Law of the Land,” as provided in the Supremacy Clause.52  
Professor John Yoo, for example, advances a criticism of self-execution 
based in separation of powers and the fear that self-executing treaties 
will displace legislative enactments and give too much power to the 
executive.53  The problem again is that this argument rests on unjusti-
fied melodramatic slippery slopism.  There are many limiting mechan-
                                                                                                                           
 
Justice Kennedy’s Roper majority opinion puts paid to the conceit that this is all just 
a bit of fluff exaggerated into something sinister and conspiratorial by Federalist So-
ciety right–wing ideologues. . . .  [but Roper] is very far indeed from mere flirtation. It 
invites the deployment of a sweeping body of legal materials from outside U.S. do-
mestic law into the process of interpreting the U.S. Constitution – and, moreover, in-
vites it into American society’s most difficult and contentious “values” questions. 
 
Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL’Y REV., June–July 2005, at 33.   
 50 Roper, 543 U.S at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 51 Id. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 598, 601, 
Justice Scalia describes American anti–homosexual sodomy laws as part of our “traditional 
notions of sexual morality” which necessarily form a rational basis for the law.  By, contrast, 
foreign laws that allow homosexual sodomy are merely “foreign moods, fads, or fashions” (quot-
ing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)); see 
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Equally irrelevant are the 
practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of 
our people.”). 
 52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding”). 
 53 John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non–
Self–Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2236 (1999) (warning ominously that “[i]f the United 
States forges multilateral agreements addressing problems that were once domestic in scope, 
treaties could replace legislation as a vehicle for domestic regulation”). 
2007] Sending the Self–Execution Doctrine to the Executioner 65 
isms in place to prevent treaty law from “taking over.”54  Although 
sovereignty concerns might justify certain restrictions on treaties, for 
example, the requirement that they be consistent with constitutional 
provisions and have the status of statutory law, they do not seem to 
justify the all-out assault on treaty law represented by the modern 
intent theory of self-execution.55   
The modern construction of self-execution will be explained with 
far more nuance in the next section, but briefly, the modern trend has 
been to find treaties unenforceable domestically, even when they are 
otherwise constitutional and provide individual domestic rights, be-
cause the instruments do not clear the extra hurdle of evidencing a 
specific “intent-to-self-execute.”56  The challenge to exceptionalists is 
to demonstrate why, in the absence of this extra hurdle, treaty law 
would somehow displace all domestic legislation and destroy our deli-
cate balance of power.  Like Scalia, it is obvious that treaty exceptio-
nalists fear, not that treaty law will be the only law, but that it will be 
any law.57  These scholars’ isolationist sentiments rise to the surface 
when explaining why foreign law should have absolutely no influence.  
Professor Yoo, for example, decries the influence of European values 
by observing: 
Europe has been given to fluctuations of ideological ex-
tremes. In the Nineteenth Century, many European nations 
still considered monarchy the best system of government. 
Indeed, the other European powers intervened after the 
French Revolution to restore the Bourbon dynasty to pow-
er. In the Twentieth Century, monarchy was followed by 
fascism, socialism, and communism. As history has demon-
strated, the performance of these regimes has been less than 
exemplary. In particular, fascism and communism, which 
were once viewed by some as advanced, modern ideologies, 
were adopted by regimes that murdered millions.58 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Treaties are limited by justiciability rules, contract interpretation principles, and their 
status as federal legislative law.  See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text (discussing modern intent theory). 
 56 See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (discussing intent–to–self–execute). 
 57 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346 (1995) (asserting that democracy argument against self–
execution “impugns the democratic character of every treaty made or that will be made by the 
President with the consent of the Senate”).  Indeed, Professor Yoo believes that treaty law is 
never binding.  It can only be given effect if Congress decides to pass a statute to enact its provi-
sions.  See Yoo, supra note 53 at 2218 (arguing that text and structure of Constitution justify 
presumptive non–self–execution).  See also Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the 
Structural Constitution, and Non–Self–Execution, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 47 (2003). 
 58 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 326.   
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Consequently, what appears to drive the modern self-execution doc-
trine is a primary belief that international and foreign law is illegiti-
mate and valueless.59 
To be fair, one can entertain a very healthy skepticism of interna-
tional processes, just as one should reasonably question domestic insti-
tutional behavior.  Many scholars have noted the ways in which inter-
national processes can be inefficient, ineffective, corrupt, and easily 
manipulated for national interests.60  While these may be reasons to 
argue for the reform of international institutions,61 they do not support 
the conclusion that treaties should be unenforceable.  The United 
States voluntarily ratifies treaties after extensive negotiations and 
consent of the President and a supermajority of the Senate.62  Only 
after this process does the treaty become law enforceable through 
domestic or international mechanisms.  The criticism of international 
processes might cause one to question whether the United States 
should submit to international procedures specified in treaties,63 but it 
simply does not affect the issue of whether treaties should be enforced 
domestically.64  When a person seeks redress under a treaty in federal 
court, our own judges, not these allegedly problematic international 
bodies, determine the fate of the case.  Moreover, one should be skep-
tical of claims that international law is per se flawed.  Those casting 
international law as less procedurally legitimate than domestic law, 
tend to establish their argument by tautology.  They prove their point 
of domestic superiority simply by painting a picture of corrupt, self-
                                                                                                                           
 59 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 33, at 317–18 (“The difficulty for international law is that 
nothing about its process of generation should lead us to believe that it should be used as a 
trumping factor over our own domestic processes, nor is there anything about international or 
indeed foreign law that should make us consider it intrinsically good.”).  See also Larsen, supra 
note 38, at 1309 (arguing enforcing treaty rights is per se illegitimate because judges may only 
counter statutes by appealing to “supermajoritarian” Constitution). 
 60 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and 
Non–Self–Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 n.2 (2003) (asserting that international legal 
institutions tend to interpret their own power broadly).  See generally José E. Alvarez, Interna-
tional Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324 (2006) (discussing various criticisms 
of international organization from different groups and perspectives). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”). 
 63 See supra note 60. 
 64 Ironically, those opposed to treaty self–execution tend to assert that individuals should 
seek treaty remedies through international procedures in the very fora they consider a priori 
illegitimate.  See infra note 110 (cases stating that remedies for treaty violations are exclusively 
international). 
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serving treaty negotiation processes contrasted with our purely-
democratic, incorruptible domestic legislative system.65 
Despite the ready criticisms, however, isolationist sentiment is 
wildly popular.  Many believe that the United States has its own tradi-
tions and should be exempt from the corrupting influence of liberal 
foreign ideals.66  For sure, the “war on terror” has heightened Ameri-
cans’ aversion, not only to international human rights restraints on 
executive power,67 but also more generally to foreign cultures.  I was 
nonetheless surprised that among my criminal law students last seme-
ster, out of all the politically-charged subjects we discussed - rape law, 
racial profiling, battered women’s syndrome, domestic violence - the 
one thing that riled them up most was the case People v. Wu,68 in which 
a Chinese woman who had attempted a parent-child suicide (the child 
died, she lived) was permitted by the California appeals court to assert 
a “cultural defense.”69  The court observed that Wu’s Chinese back-
ground was relevant to whether she was “reasonably provoked” into 
the killing.70  The majority of my students, or at least the vocal ones, 
were extremely disturbed by the ruling, believing that the substitution 
of the reasonable Chinese woman standard for the typical “reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See, e.g., Joseph Keller, Sovereignty vs. Internationalism and Where United States Courts 
Should Find International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 353 (2005) (characterizing interna-
tional legal actors as unaccountable and even rent–seeking as opposed to domestic legislators 
who are responsible to public).  According to Keller, customary international law should be 
ignored because: 
 
[a]n article by a law professor may appear in a prestigious journal, boldly and autho-
ritatively declaring X to be a well established rule of customary international law, 
with great academic pomp and bravado, yet one cannot know if this article was put 
together hastily in a desperate attempt to meet a publishing deadline. Or perhaps 
more likely, given the strict criteria for law review articles (a topic should be “ripe” 
and present a new idea not “preempted” by another author), the professor merely 
espoused his/her theory because it was new or unique, and not because it is well sup-
ported logically or advisable as a matter of public policy. 
Id. at 356.  While the above is apparently a reason to reject customary international law all to-
gether, curiously, it is not a reason to disregard the writings of professors who support isolation-
ism, argue in favor of federalism, revere originalism, and oppose treaty supremacy.  See also 
McGinnis, supra note 33, at 308 (asserting that only “good” body of law can constrain democratic 
legislation and contrasting “bad” international law with “good” domestic constitutional law).  
But see Resnik, supra note 22, at 1574 (noting that process by which international norms become 
domestic law is often deeply democratic). 
 66 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 273–75 (describing dramatic negative responses by Congress 
persons to citation of foreign opinion in Roper).  See also Shane B. Kelbley, Note, Reason With-
out Borders: How Transnational Values Cannot Be Contained, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1595, 
1630–31 (2005) (discussing congressional response). 
 67 See Martin S. Flaherty, “External” Versus “Internal” in International Law, 29 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 447, 448 (2006) (noting that war on terror has fueled American exceptionalism). 
 68 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1991) (unpublished disposition). 
 69 Id. at 879–80. 
 70 Id. at 884–85. 
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man” standard was an assault on American-ness.71  In fact, many were 
so passionate that foreigners should “check their culture at the door” 
that they patently refused to argue the other side of the issue.   
Popular sentiment against foreign law and cultures leads some to 
argue that internationalism is a product of the liberal elitism of self-
aggrandizing law professors and judges.  Professors Yoo and Delahun-
ty, for example, assert that internationalism “appears to be linked to 
the emergence of what can be called a deterritorialized, ‘cosmopoli-
tan’ moral sensibility, generally shared by governing elites of the ad-
vanced nations.”72  Similarly, Professor John McGinnis asserts: 
Publicists [of international law] are essentially international 
law professors. As a group they are not required to be repre-
sentative of the views of their nation’s citizens nor are they 
likely to be so. We have evidence, for instance, that elite in-
ternational law professors in the United States are very un-
representative of popular opinion, leaning Democratic ra-
ther than Republican by a ratio of over eleven to two.73 
One should, however, view liberal elitism arguments with a jaun-
diced eye.  Such rhetoric has been a time-honored favorite of old se-
gregationists and modern neo-conservatives to defeat measures that 
protect religious, racial, gender, and other minorities from subordina-
tion by an oppressive majority.74  The trick is to switch characteriza-
tions, casting those who support minority subordination as “ordinary 
folk” who are oppressed by overbearing liberals wishing to curtail 
their freedom to support anti-minority policies.75  
                                                                                                                           
 71 Initially, some misread the case as allowing a foreigner to have a defense whenever an 
act is legal in his country of origin.  I explained, however, that the case really was about how 
subjective the reasonableness standard should be and whether a jury should adopt the point of 
view of a reasonable person from a foreign culture.  Many students answered with a resounding 
“no,” stating that immigrants have a positive obligation to assimilate to “American culture” as 
soon as they arrive in the United States.  When I asked what “American culture” is, my majori-
ty–minority class replied that it is the culture the “average” American possesses. 
 72 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 330.  
 73 McGinnis, supra note 33, at 314. 
 74 This tactic was used by Governor Wallace to drum up support for his pro–segregation 
campaigns.  See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT 
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1992) (“Wallace portrayed the civil 
rights issue... as the imposition on working men and women of intrusive ‘social’ policies by an 
insulated, liberal, elitist cabal of lawyers, judges, editorial writers, academics, government bureau-
crats, and planners.”).   
 75 See Kelbley, supra note 66, at 1632 (observing that conservatives argued against per-
ceived “gay rights” opinion in Lawrence by asserting that “activist judges” were imposing per-
sonal beliefs on American population). See also Aya Gruber, Navigating Diverse Identities: Build-
ing Coalitions Through Redistribution of Academic Capital, an Exercise in Praxis, 35 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2005). (discussing “the co–opting of minority status by privileged 
members of society”).  In the 1992 Campaign, Vice Presidential nominee Dan Quayle famously 
 
2007] Sending the Self–Execution Doctrine to the Executioner 69 
Another method of denigrating international law, an old favorite 
of Justice Scalia, is to argue that its sheer volume makes it susceptible 
to citation for any given principle.76  Critics of international and com-
parative law assert that such law is essentially meaningless because 
jurists can pick and choose among foreign principles to cite just the 
ones they like.77  Justice Breyer’s response to this contention is smile-
provoking: 
How do we know we can keep [citation of international 
sources] under control? How do we know we cite both 
side[s]? How do we know we looked for everything? Well, 
I’d say that kind of a problem arises with any sort of cita-
tion. A judge can do what he’s supposed to do, or not.78 
Despite charges, bordering on ad hominem attack, that they are 
misguided,79 elitist,80 power-hungry,81 and even nepotistic,82 certain Jus-
                                                                                                                           
blamed the “cultural elite” for imposing un–American liberal ideals on the nation.  He characte-
rized gay and abortion rights as products of “cynical,” “sneering” “Sophisticates” and their “radi-
cal” ideology and contrasted that with average “American” ideals.  He stated, “Talk about right 
and wrong, and they’ll try to mock us in newsrooms, sitcom studios and faculty lounges across 
America, but in the heart of America, in the homes and workplaces and churches, the message is 
heard.”  Andrew Rosenthal, The 1992 Campaign; Quayle Attacks a “Cultural Elite,” Saying It 
Mocks Nation’s Values, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A1. 
 76 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for “invok[ing] alien 
law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignor[ing] it otherwise”).   
 77 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 33, at 325–27 (asserting that malleable international law 
serves as cover for antidemocratic judicial activism). 
 78 Scalia–Breyer debate, supra note 21 (Justice Breyer’s statement).  Breyer goes on to say: 
 
With the legislative history I’d say, and I’d say with [foreign sources], you’re a con-
scientious judge or you’re not. And if you are going to apply it unfairly, why wouldn’t 
you apply all kinds of things unfairly? There are plenty of opportunities to do that if 
you want to do it, but then if that’s what you’re going to do, go into some other pro-
fession, because I don’t see what the reward would be in a profession like ours, the 
law, which prizes people being straightforward, I think, being honest and doing the 
job properly.   
 
Id.  It seems unchallengeable that the selectivity argument can be used against any basis of legal 
interpretation including Scalia’s sainted originalism.  See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT 
AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 300–13 (1988) (stating bluntly that “the Court has flunked 
history” and that “judges exploit history by making . . . it yield results that are not historically 
founded”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional Ex-
pansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601 (1998) (criticizing Court’s selective use of consti-
tutional history in originalist arguments). 
 79 The tenor of Scalia, Yoo, and others’ criticisms seems to indicate that they believe “in-
ternationalist” Justices are foolish for failing to realize that they are either allowing foreigners to 
rule the Court or their citation of foreign law is meaningless.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“‘Acknowledgment’ of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this 
Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment – which is surely what it parades as 
today.”).  See also Anderson, supra note 49, at 33 (referring to international opinion as Justice 
Stevens’ & Breyer’s “hobbyhorse”). 
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tices are resolute that the American legal system has much to gain 
from an increased understanding and incorporation of foreign and 
international legal rules and norms.83  Like Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Breyer believes that the increasing comparativist nature of the Su-
preme Court: 
reflects the “globalization” of human rights, a phrase that 
refers to the ever-stronger consensus (now near world-
wide) as to the importance of protecting basic human 
rights, the embodiment of that consensus in legal docu-
ments, such as national constitutions and international 
treaties, and the related decision to enlist judges - i.e., in-
dependent judiciaries - as instruments to help make that 
protection effective in practice.84   
Other Justices, like Stevens and former Justice O’Connor, have 
likewise been supportive of the incorporation of international values 
into constitutional analysis.85  These jurists therefore endorse a practice 
that many, like Scalia, characterize as radically and dangerously inter-
                                                                                                                           
 80 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 330 (stating that internationalist “Justices . . . 
stand at the very apex of [international] elites”). 
 81 See id. at 329 (speculating that Court cites international law to augment its own power). 
 82 Some critics go so far as to insinuate that the increasing internationalism of the Court is 
a product of global aristocratic nepotism: 
 
Supreme Court judges interact with their peers in other nations on a more regular 
basis. Their long summer recess is a perfect time to make the acquaintance of justices 
in their favorite nations. Lake Como or the south of France provides a good atmos-
phere for bonding. All of us seek approval from our peers and the Justices would na-
turally regard foreign justices as their equals. 
 
McGinnis, supra note 4, at 326–27.  See also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 329 (asserting that 
Court’s use of foreign law indicates its desire to be part of “transnational class of judicial and 
regulatory elites”). 
 83 See Scalia–Breyer debate, supra note 21 (statements of Justice Breyer); Ginsburg, supra 
note 1.  Cf. Mark Tushnet, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”: Referring to Foreign 
Law to Express Nationhood, 69 ALB. L. REV. 809, 810 (2006) (explaining that Court may have 
nationalist reason for such incorporation because  “non–U.S. law might be a way of ensuring that 
the United States helps lead the world’s nations to a better way of governing themselves and 
their peoples”).   
 84 Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., The Supreme Court and The 
New International Law, remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html. 
 85 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring); Sandra 
Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law (March 13–16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (“Although 
international law and the law of other nations are rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. 
courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the international community should at 
times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.”). 
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national.86  If they support internationalism to this extent, it is curious 
that these same justices have not been vocal in opposition to the mod-
ern self-execution doctrine.  The modern intent theory of self-
execution permits the government to be isolationist, not with respect 
to foreign norms in constitutional law, but regarding the very interna-
tional human rights instruments to which it has vowed allegiance.  
Why are liberal Court members so much less passionate about the 
self-execution doctrine than about interpretive incorporation of inter-
national law? 
The answer may be that the principles behind the modern self-
execution doctrine are not as readily identifiable as isolationist as the 
arguments against international influence in constitutional law.  Those 
opposed to treaty self-execution do not always denigrate the rights 
and obligations in the treaty as having been influenced by radical or 
corrupt foreigners.87  Rather, they characterize self-execution as a doc-
trine with roots in contract interpretation and civil remedies law, and 
defend it by arguing that it preserves federalism and a delicate bal-
ance of power.88  I will demonstrate, however, that the modern self-
execution doctrine is isolationist at its very core.  In fact, it goes fur-
ther than arguments against constitutional incorporation because it 
asks courts to ignore international law, not in the interpretation of 
domestic constitutional rights, but in the very area where the constitu-
tional structure requires judicial enforcement of international law. 
 
II.  SELF-EXECUTION:  FROM CONTRACT INTERPRETATION TO  ANTI-
INTERNATIONALISM 
 
Any analysis of the self-execution doctrine and domestic enfor-
ceability of treaties should start with the Supremacy Clause, which 
provides, “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (calling citation of international opinion “dangerous dic-
ta”); see also supra note 66 (discussing congressional response to Roper).  See, e.g., Peter Rubin, 
American Constitution Society Supreme Court Roundup (July 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/SCOTUStrans.pdf (describing references to European Court of Hu-
man Rights in Lawrence decision as “remarkable” and “quite extraordinary”); Tony Mauro, 
Supreme Court Opening up to World Opinion, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2003, at 1, 8 (noting re-
cent “breakthrough term” regarding international law, in which “the ostrich’s head came out of 
the sand”); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 15–25, 
135–39 (2003) (discussing “insidious appeal of internationalism” in constitutional interpretation). 
 87 But see John McGinnis, The Limits of International Law in Protecting Dignity, 27 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2003) (arguing that human rights treaties are procedurally undemocratic 
and substantively invalid because they do not apply economic theory). 
 88 See Yoo, supra note 53 passim. 
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Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”89  
This clause demonstrates, not only that treaties are enforceable do-
mestic law, but also that they are federal law binding on the states.  
Many scholars much more proficient in legal history than I have dis-
cussed the events surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Su-
premacy Clause90 and concluded that the Framers established a “mon-
ist” system, in which treaty law and domestic law are one in the same,91 
to signal the young nation’s respect for international agreements.92  
Thus, for the first fifty years of the republic, treaties were presump-
tively valid sources of domestic rights. 
In 1829, the concept of self-execution was introduced into Su-
preme Court law in Foster v. Neilson.93  The case involved land rights 
under a treaty between Spain and the United States.94  The Court in-
terpreted the treaty’s directive that Spanish land grants “shall be rati-
fied and confirmed” as only obligating Congress to pass legislation in 
the future legalizing the land transfers.  The Court subsequently found 
the treaty domestically unenforceable because it simply did not create 
any present rights.95   
The Court’s interpretive move is itself troubling.  Ordinary con-
tracts often state that parties “shall” commit future acts.  When a party 
fails to fulfill the future contractual obligation, courts will either find 
the contract breached and order compensation or specific perfor-
mance, or hold the contract unenforceable because the future obliga-
tion was too vague.96  In Foster, the problem was not that the future 
obligation was too vague for judicial enforcement - the problem was 
the Court interpreted the future obligation as requiring Congress to 
                                                                                                                           
 89 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 90 See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self–Executing Treaties, 89 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 695, 697–700 (1995); Paust, supra note 12; Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical 
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2095 (1999); but see Yoo, supra note 53, at 2231. 
 91 Monist systems are contrasted with “dualist” systems that always require implementing 
legislation before recognizing a treaty as domestically enforceable.  See Derek Jinks & David 
Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126 (2004).  
Britain is a commonly cited example of a “dualist” legal system.  See Lord Templeman, Treaty–
Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI. KENT L. REV. 459, 48183 (1991). 
 92 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829) (stating that the “different prin-
ciple” established by the U.S. declares a “treaty to be the law of the land”). 
 93 Id. 
 94 The treaty stated in pertinent part that “all the grants of land made before the 24th of 
January 1818, by his Catholic Majesty, & c. shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in 
possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories 
had remained under the domination of his Catholic majesty.”  Id. at 276. 
 95 Id. at 25455. 
 96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981). 
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act.97  The Court was then unwilling to force Congress to legislate to 
fulfill the treaty obligation because to do so would have opened up a 
separation of powers can of worms.98   
In the first instance, therefore, Foster set forth a somewhat ques-
tionable interpretation of the treaty.  Why would the parties enter into 
a treaty that involved only an illusory promise to ratify land grants?  
The most straightforward reading of the treaty, and one the Court 
adopted four years later when it overturned Foster in United States v. 
Percheman,99 is that the treaty obligated the U.S. government, as a 
whole, to recognize the validity of the land grants as of the signing of 
the instrument.100  As a result, it could be that the whole of self-
execution law arose because of an unfortunate treaty interpretation.101  
Nonetheless, courts frequently cite Foster as the basis for the self-
execution doctrine, relying on the following language: 
[A treaty] is . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equiv-
alent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of it-
self without the aid of any legislative provision. But when 
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either 
of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the trea-
ty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment; and the legislature must execute the contract before 
it can become a rule for the Court.102 
After Foster, some cases simply continued to reaffirm unqualified 
treaty supremacy,103 while others distinguished between executory 
treaties, which only create future obligations and require implement-
ing legislation to be enforceable, and executed treaties, which auto-
matically operate as valid domestic law.104  Early on, two other limita-
                                                                                                                           
 97 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315. 
 98 Id. 
 99 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 100 Id. at 88–89. 
 101 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1128 (1992); Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from 
International Legal History:  The Self–Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripar-
tite Agreement, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1091, 1110 (2000) (criticizing Foster’s treaty interpretation). 
 102 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254. 
 103 See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 366, 372 (1857); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593 (1832).  See also Paust, 
supra note 12, at 771–73. 
 104 See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285, 288–89 (1902); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); See 
also Paust, supra note 12, at 771 n.82 (citing cases).  There are modern day offshoots of the ex-
ecutory-executed distinction.  More recent lower court decisions have held overly ambiguous 
treaty provisions unenforceable because enforcing such provisions would strain judicial compe-
tence.  See, e.g., Am. Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding 
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tions on the domestic enforceability of treaty provisions emerged.  The 
Head Money Cases of 1884 established that when a treaty’s provisions 
create obligations only vis-a-vis sovereign states (horizontal obliga-
tions),105 that treaty is non-self-executing because it does not establish 
judicially enforceable individual rights (through vertical obligations).106  
Other older cases established the equality of treaties to federal legisla-
tive law, thereby precluding the enforcement of treaties violative of 
the Constitution.107 
These early constructions of self-execution are fairly uncompli-
cated.  Despite questionable interpretive moves, Foster, at most, stands 
for the relatively circumscribed principle that courts must give effect 
to the meaning of the terms of a treaty, as evidenced by its language.108  
It generally makes sense for an enforcing court to try to figure out the 
nature of obligations in the treaty.109  The other early limitations also 
make sense.  Treaties that simply do not create individual rights can-
not be enforced by private individuals.110  Moreover, the choice to put 
treaties on the same level as federal legislative law seems beyond re-
proach.  Treaty displacement of constitutional law would allow con-
structive amendment far removed from the process set forth in the 
Constitution.  It is reasonable to believe, given the level of consensus 
required for constitutional amendment, that if the Framers had in-
                                                                                                                           
article I of Geneva Conventions non-self-executing because its broad language does not provide 
“any intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement”). 
 105 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1957) 
(plurality opinion).  The straightforward claim is that treaties, like statutes, may not infringe on 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.  The more controversial claim is that treaties may not intrude 
on subject areas over which Congress has “exclusive” power.  See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 
1055, 1057 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing whether treaty can conflict with “exclusive” congres-
sional power and concluding that property clause does not grant Congress exclusive authority 
over transfer of U.S. property). 
 108 Carlos Vázquez notes, “The Court’s holding in Foster recognizes that the general rule 
established by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are enforceable in the courts without 
prior legislative action, is one that may be altered by the parties to the treaty through the treaty 
itself.”  Vázquez, supra note 90, at 702. 
 109 This does not necessarily mean that a vague treaty is per se unenforceable.  Courts are 
obligated to give effect to ambiguous treaty provisions as they would to ambiguous statutory 
provisions.  See id. at 715.  (“[T]here may be imprecise treaty provisions that the judicial branch 
is well suited to enforce directly.”). 
 110 Unfortunately, lower courts in recent years have found treaties that appear to confer 
individual rights to nonetheless be exclusively between nations and therefore non–self–
executing.  See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850–51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that 
Security Council resolution does not confer individual rights); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 
57, 64 (Va. 1998) (finding that Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol 
on Disputes do not create individual rights). 
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tended to allow amendment through treaty process, they would have 
said so.111 
While the early constructions of self-execution continue to exist, 
the modern intent-based self-execution doctrine has really taken on a 
life of its own.  These days, lower federal courts routinely endeavor, 
not only to discern the intent of the parties as to terms of a treaty, but 
also to discern the intent of United States treaty makers and their 
spokespersons as to whether the treaty should have domestic effect. 
As a consequence, courts now find that a prerequisite to treaty enfor-
ceability is a general “intent-to-self-execute” on the part of U.S. treaty 
makers.112   This modern intent doctrine manifests in both milder and 
stronger forms.  In its milder form, courts will not enforce a treaty if 
the language of the treaty or other evidence, such as statements from 
various U.S. treaty makers, indicate that U.S. drafters did not intend 
the treaty to be self-executing.  Thus, evidence of “intent-not-to-self-
execute” renders the treaty domestically unenforceable.113  In the 
stronger form, courts refuse to enforce a treaty domestically unless 
there is specific language in the treaty or from treaty makers that the 
treaty shall be self-executing.  These cases take treaty and drafter si-
lence as establishing non-enforceability,114 thus reversing the historical 
presumption that treaties are by their very nature supreme federal 
law.115 
How did the quite straightforward concept that courts should en-
force treaties by their terms morph into a doctrine creating specific 
evidentiary hurdles to the domestic enforcement of treaty law?  The 
reasoning, which is necessarily related to the Foster court’s mistaken 
assertion that the Spanish treaty’s ambiguity involved future acts of 
Congress, goes something like this:  (1) Foster held a treaty domesti-
cally unenforceable because it obligated Congress to pass implement-
                                                                                                                           
 111 As a consequence, a treaty cannot abridge constitutional guarantees of free speech or 
equal protection.  A harder question is whether a treaty may create law in an area reserved 
“exclusively” to Congress.  See supra note 107. 
 112 See, e.g., Renkel v. U.S., 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding Convention Against 
Torture not self–executing because Senate and President intended no self–execution) & infra 
notes 113–14 (citing cases). 
 113 See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding provisions of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights non–self–executing because “[t]he Senate’s 
intent was clear – the treaty is not self–executing”); U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 881 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(finding intent against self–execution in part from statements of individual Senator). 
 114 See, e.g., Igartua-De La Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding treaty self–
executing only when “the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self–executing’”) 
 115 Vázquez asserts, “The courts that have suggested that treaties are judicially enforceable 
only if they were intended to be judicially enforceable have thus transformed the self–execution 
inquiry in a manner that seems fundamentally incompatible with the text of the Constitution.”  
Supra note 90, at 709. 
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ing legislation;116 and (2) therefore, before enforcing any treaty domes-
tically, one must look at the parties’ intent as to whether Congress 
must pass implementing legislation.117  This logic may seem appealing, 
but in the end it is incorrect.  Foster simply held that a treaty failing to 
establish any present obligations cannot be enforced.  It addressed 
neither a situation in which a treaty did establish current rights but 
nonetheless called them domestically unenforceable, nor a situation in 
which a treaty established current rights but other evidence indicated 
intent on the part of U.S. treaty makers to render it domestically unen-
forceable.  Consequently, it does not follow from the proposition that 
the intent of drafters is relevant to determining the obligations within 
the treaty, that evidence of “intent-to-self-execute” must be a pre-
requisite to treaty enforceability.118  This is, however, precisely what 
modern courts hold.119  They find treaties unenforceable even when 
they confer present, individual rights and provide mechanisms for pri-
vate enforcement. 
Other modern approaches to self-execution determine treaty en-
forceability, not solely by intent, but by applying a multi-factored test 
or examining whether the treaty contains a private right of action.120  
Unfortunately, these tests also erect unjustifiable barriers to treaty 
enforceability, grounded in a presumption of treaty law inferiority 
rather than supremacy.121  In Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, for example, the Seventh Circuit set forth a number of consid-
erations underlying self-execution analysis:  
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; 
(2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the na-
ture of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the 
                                                                                                                           
 116 This thesis initially appears to be supported by language from Foster stating that “when 
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a 
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the 
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” Foster, 27 U.S. 
(2 Pet.) at 314.   
 117 Sloss notes, “Commentators have generally understood Foster and Percheman to distin-
guish between treaty provisions that have no domestic legal effect in the absence of implement-
ing legislation (non-self-executing) and provisions that do have domestic legal effect, even with-
out implementing legislation (self-executing).”  Sloss, supra note 39, at 21–22; see also Vázquez, 
supra note 90, at 701–02. 
 118 See Sloss, supra note 39, at 13 (arguing that Foster is not about “whether the treaty mak-
ers intended to create a non–self–executing treaty,” but about type of international legal obliga-
tion they intended to create and whether it was possible to enforce it). 
 119 See supra notes 112–14 (citing cases). 
 120 See, e.g., Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); People of Saipan v. United 
States, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 121 See Vázquez, supra note 90, at 711 (criticizing multi–factored test as invitation for judges 
to “engage in an open–ended inquiry to determine on a case–by case basis whether judicial 
enforcement of a particular treaty is a good idea”). 
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availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement me-
chanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right 
of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve 
the dispute.122   
To the extent that prongs 1, 3, and 6 relate to the actual obligations in 
the agreement, they appear to be fairly straightforward extensions of 
Foster.123  Courts must at some level decide what the treaty means, and 
the treaty must be practically enforceable.124  Prongs 1 and 2, however, 
may relate to the requirement of “intent-to-self-execute,” and, as such, 
are subject to the criticism set forth above.125  Prongs 4 and 5 appear, 
on their faces, to reflect a presumption of treaty illegitimacy.  If a trea-
ty creates rights and mechanisms for private enforcement, it should be 
irrelevant whether or not legislation or international processes pro-
vide alternate ways to vindicate similar rights.  When a statute creates 
rights and remedies, it is not rendered unenforceable by the existence 
of similar rights or remedies under constitutional or common law.  
Holding that alternative mechanisms render a treaty unenforceable 
demonstrates a basic belief that treaty remedies are principally disfa-
vored.  The fifth prong is likewise gratuitously hostile to treaty law.  
Why are courts permitted to weigh the “costs” of enforcing a treaty, 
when doing so would be completely unjustified in the statutory con-
text?  If a statute validly creates rights, a court may not refuse to en-
force it on the basis of the costs of litigation.126  For treaties, however, 
courts are invited to undertake roving “cost” analyses that can be used 
to strike down duly enacted law.  It seems like an absolute affront to 
the President and Senate that courts can strike down valid treaty law 
based solely on subjective cost determinations.127 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373. 
 123 The sixth prong can be interpreted in a couple of different ways.  One way is compatible 
with Foster in that it asserts certain treaty terms are so ambiguous that it would strain judicial 
competency to interpret and enforce them. See id. at 374 (UN Charter provisions are “phrased in 
broad generalities, suggesting that they are declarations of principles”);.  A more problematic 
way to interpret prong six is that the judiciary cannot enforce treaties if doing so interferes with 
“political processes.”  See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 375 (holding present case involved “foreign policy 
matters” that “courts are ill–equipped to anticipate or handle”). 
 124 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 125 See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 126 The cost analysis serves to discourage treaty enforcement, given that courts are “excee-
dingly timid in enforcing treaties, particularly when individuals have sought to enforce them 
against the executive branch of the federal government.”  Vázquez, supra note 90, at 717. 
 127 This unjustified consideration of the costs of treaty litigation likely stems from Judge 
Bork’s concurrence in Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, which is fairly obsessed with the bur-
dens of treaty enforcement.  He warns that permitting private Geneva claims would “flood 
courts throughout the world” and “create perhaps hundreds of thousands or millions of law-
suits.”  726 F.2d at 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
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Finally, lower courts sometimes find a treaty non-self-executing 
because it does not itself provide a “private right of action,” that is, it 
specifies rights, but not how to remedy them.128  This private right of 
action problem is also confronted in the statutory and constitutional 
context.  The idea is that not every statute that creates legal rights ex-
plicitly provides for aggrieved individuals to sue privately.  Generally, 
however, individual rights from statutes or constitutions can be en-
forced privately so long as some law provides a mechanism for private 
suit, whether statutory or common law.  Statutory and constitutional 
rights may be enforced through external cross-referencing statutory 
provisions even when the statute or constitution creating the right 
does not itself provide an internal private right of action.129  When it 
comes to treaties, however, courts view the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism within the treaty as the end of the enforceability inquiry.  
They hold that a treaty lacking its own private right of action is non-
self-executing and thus unenforceable even though a federal statute 
provides a private right of action or the individual seeks to invoke the 
treaty defensively.130  Again, this signals a belief that treaty law is a 
subordinate form of law and must clear the higher hurdle of having an 
internal private right of action before enforcement. 
It is relatively clear that the modern intent doctrine was not a ne-
cessary corollary of the principle set forth in Foster.  Although some 
experts have characterized the doctrine as the culmination of years of 
poor legal analysis,131 I believe that isolationist sentiment was the driv-
                                                                                                                           
 128 There is some confusion among the lower courts as to whether a treaty must show intent 
to provide a private right of action or an actual private right of action.  Compare, Goldstar v. 
United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968–69 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring “an intent to provide a private right 
of action”); U.S. v. Bent–Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (same) with United States 
v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A treaty is self-executing if it creates private-
ly enforceable rights.”); Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 
(Bork, J., concurring); Columbia Marine Serv., Inc. v. Reffet, Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 311 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(same). 
 129 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action for governmental viola-
tions of the Constitution.  See also Vázquez, supra note 90, at 719 (noting that many enforceable 
laws specify rights without remedies). 
 130 See, e.g. Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003) (habeas corpus statute 
only applies to self–executing treaties); Raffington v. Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(“seriously doubt[ing]” whether a claim based on non–self–executing treaty is cognizable in 
habeas review); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).  But see Atuar v. U.S., 
156 Fed. Appx. 555, 563 n.12 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished disposition) (entertaining “the possibil-
ity that a habeas corpus petition may require a court to review a particular detention in light of a 
non–self–executing but constitutionally ratified treaty”); Vázquez, supra note 90, at 710 (assert-
ing that treaty rights may be invoked defensively or through external mechanisms). 
 131 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a 
Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1887 (2005) (calling modern “bad faith” treaty jurispru-
dence product of “combination of inattention and Supreme Court rhetorical ambiguity”). 
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ing force behind the modern self-execution doctrine.  Consider the 
tangible results of the modern intent doctrine.  The first practical ef-
fect of the doctrine is to allow the United States to sign and ratify 
treaties guaranteeing individual rights, typically human rights treaties, 
while simultaneously declaring that the treaty cannot be enforced by 
individuals domestically, either by expressly stating so in a non-self-
execution declaration132 or otherwise indicating through more informal 
statements.133  In essence, the United States can ratify treaties, appease 
international actors, and pretend to be a leader in human rights, while 
eliminating the only realistic mechanism for accountability.134  While 
one might argue that international institutional mechanisms are suffi-
cient for vindication of individual rights under, for example, the Con-
vention against Torture or the Geneva Conventions,135 that argument 
rings hollow in the face of a stream of unmitigated violations of these 
treaties by the United States since 2001.136  It is quite evident that the 
best hope of curtailing violations is through individual lawsuits seek-
ing relief.137  Under the modern self-execution doctrine, such suits have 
little ability to check government abuse because they will be dismissed 
whenever a court finds some evidence of treaty maker intent against 
self-execution or even silence on the issue.138 
The second thing the modern intent doctrine accomplishes is the 
presumptive undermining of treaties signed before the modern doc-
                                                                                                                           
 132 See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S4783–84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (“[T]he United States declares 
that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights] are not self–executing.”). 
 133 See Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (relying on post–
ratification statement of Attorney General). 
 134 Jordan Paust refers to the sign but reserve trend as “wretched” and criticizes the U.S. 
reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stating, “Rarely has a 
formal attempt at adherence to a treaty been so blatantly meaningless and so openly defiant of 
its terms, the needed efficacy of its norms, and the very possibility of its direct application as 
supreme law of the land.”  Jordan Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of 
Non–Self–Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1257 
(1993). 
 135 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 469 (4th Cir. 2003) (asserting that Geneva’s 
“values are vindicated by diplomatic means and reciprocity”). 
 136 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over 
the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 571, 631 (1991) (maintaining that 
sign but reserve trend is fundamentally incompatible with “America’s self–perception as a lead-
ing proponent of human rights”). 
 137 Indeed, after their somewhat successful litigation, both Hamdi and Padilla were released 
from military detention.   
 138 See Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The International 
Legal Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FIU L. REV. 71, 
85–86 (2006) (characterizing non–self–execution as “weapon” that permits “international out-
law” U.S. to engage in “double–dealing by, on the one hand, agreeing to be bound by a treaty 
and, on the other hand, reserving the right to not give the treaty any effect”). 
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trine took hold in American law.  Typically, when individuals enter into 
contracts, such contracts set forth specific terms that become enforce-
able when the contract is validly executed.  It would be unusual for a 
contract signatory to assume that the contract is unenforceable unless 
it contains a provision explicitly stating that parties can enforce the 
contract.  Why, then, would treaty makers add a specific provision to 
assert that the rights set forth in the treaty are domestically enforcea-
ble?  The only reason they would do so is if they believed doing so was 
required for treaty enforceability.  In the era prior to the advent of the 
modern self-execution doctrine, in which both the 1929 and 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions ratifications took place, treaty makers would have 
had no reason to assume that ratified treaty provisions are not pre-
sumptive federal law.139  As a consequence, looking for an explicit “in-
tent-to-self-execute” will prove an impassable barrier for treaties rati-
fied prior to the last fifty years.140    
There is also historical evidence that isolationist sentiment under-
lay the emboldened intent based self-execution doctrine.  After World 
War II, there was dramatic expansion and development of interna-
tional institutions and instruments.141  The UN Charter was promptly 
enacted, and ratification of the Genocide Convention lay on the near 
horizon.  After the ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, a couple of 
cases tested the viability of the Charter as a substantive restraint on 
states’ abilities to discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities.142  
Four Supreme Court justices even weighed in on the issue, asserting 
that the UN Charter could provide a legal vehicle for curtailing racial 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See Sloss, supra note 39, at 71 (noting that prior to 1965, there was little support for 
modern intent doctrine); David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? 
The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez–Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 20, 101 (2006) (noting that before World War II, Court recognized presumption of treaty en-
forceability and after War said very little about it).  There is one pre–Geneva case, Cameron 
Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913), in which the Court appears broadly to 
hold a treaty non–self–executing on the basis of intent, but that case seems to be exceptional in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  See infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.   
 140 See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, 
and Comparative Executive “Creativity,” in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 51, 71 
(2006) (“[The Geneva Conventions] reflect an older conception of international law, which 
generally did not address how a domestic legal system should provide remedies or otherwise be 
ordered.”).   
 141 See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
579, 585 (2003) (noting that  post–World War II period saw “the birth of the modern human 
rights era”). 
 142 See Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 486–88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (holing that “Alien 
Land Law must . . . yield to the treaty as the superior authority”); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 
633, 649–50, 673 (1948) (discussing UN Charter in concurrences). 
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discrimination.143  These cases were enough to cause concern to con-
servative politicians that international law might spell an end to se-
gregation.144   
In 1951, Senator John Bricker, a Republican from Ohio, intro-
duced a draft amendment to the Supremacy Clause to make all trea-
ties unenforceable in the absence of implementing legislation.145  Many 
experts conclude that Bricker’s primary purpose for introducing the 
measure was to preserve white supremacy.146  However, preservation of 
segregation was not the whole picture of the Bricker Amendment.147  
Statements of self-proclaimed “Brickerites” confirm that isolationism 
and hostility to international law also lay at the root of the pernicious 
amendment.  Frank Holman, former ABA President and architect of 
the Bricker Amendment, argued that the Amendment marked the 
“line . . . between those Americans who believe in the preservation of 
national sovereignty and national independence and those who be-
lieve that our national independence . . . should yield to international 
considerations and some kind of world authority.”148   
The Bricker Amendment eventually failed to pass, and Bricker 
abandoned his efforts after securing assurances from the Whitehouse 
                                                                                                                           
 143 332 U.S. at 649–50 (Black, J., concurring (joined by Douglas, J.)) (asking, “How can this 
nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occu-
pancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?”); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., con-
curring (joined by Rutledge, J.)) (stating that “inconsistency with the [UN] Charter . . . is but one 
more reason why the statute must be condemned”). 
 144 In Senator Bricker’s view, Oyama and Sei Fujii signaled the looming threat of interna-
tional human rights covenants “forcing unacceptable theories and practices upon the citizens of 
the United States of America.”  U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd Cong., CONG. REC. 1st sess., 97, pt. 9: 
11361. The quotation is an excerpt from a resolution adopted by the Tampa Rotary Club that 
Senator Bricker read into the Record. 
 145 There were several versions of the amendment, but the basic premise of the amendment 
was to ensure that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only 
through legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.” S. Rep. No. 83–412, at 1 
(1953). 
 146 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 57, at 348 (“The campaign for the Bricker Amendment 
apparently represented a move by anti–civil–rights and ‘states’ rights’ forces to seek to prevent – 
in particular – bringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.”); 
Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil Rights and the Debate 
over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights Law on the Interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) (stating that “real concern” of 
Brickerites “appeared to be defending state sovereignty and preserving the ability of southern 
states to maintain segregation and white supremacy in the face of the U.N. Charter”).  But see 
Nelson Richards, Comment,  The Bricker Amendment and Congress’s Failure to Check the Infla-
tion of the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Power, 94 CAL. L. REV. 175, 177–78 (2006) (asserting that 
concerns over communism abroad and President Truman’s amassing of executive power 
prompted Bricker Amendment).   
 147 See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1989-90 
(2004) (asserting that “while the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the early human rights conven-
tions may well have reflected Southern racism, it also reflected something else”). 
 148 HOLMAN, supra note 34, at 22. 
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that the President would not sign the Genocide Convention or pursue 
other human rights treaties.149  Nonetheless, that moment was very im-
portant in introducing a discourse pitting basic American-ness against 
treaty law.150  It helped begin to erase the long-held presumption of 
treaty supremacy and create a whisper of treaty law illegitimacy that 
over time became a scream.  Experts assert that current hostility to 
domestic treaty enforcement is the result of a continuing haunting by 
Bricker’s ghost.151  Perhaps this is why for many jurists today, “the con-
cept of individuals enforcing international law has the whiff of an un-
pleasant oxymoron, implying a role for individuals in a legal system in 
which, the traditionalists insist, only sovereign states are legitimate 
players.”152  Domestic enforcement of treaty and customary interna-
tional law is thus often characterized as the liberal creation of elitist 
law professors and judges, and treaty enforcement is contrasted with 
“time-honored” rules regarding separation of powers and executive 
priority in foreign affairs.153  Moreover, the rhetoric of Bricker has 
been resurrected by modern law professors who decry the creation of 
“world” values that threaten to displace American sovereignty.154 
In sum, the early self-execution cases, although certainly not 
beyond reproach themselves, were at least narrow doctrines grounded 
in reasonable contract interpretation and constitutional construction.  
Today, self-execution has come to represent a separate, often impassa-
ble, independent barrier to treaty enforcement, grounded in a basic 
hostility to the domestic application of international law.  This hostility 
is not seen in our constitutional structure, early legal history, or even 
early treaty case law.  To the contrary, treaty supremacy seems to have 
been the traditional rule.  Nonetheless, this hostility has been growing 
throughout the post-World War II era, and it reaches a fever pitch in 
the federal courts of appeals’ opinions in Hamdi and Hamdan.   
                                                                                                                           
 149 Henkin, supra note 57, at 348–49.  Eisenhower’s secretary of state promised that the 
administration would not seek ratification of any of the various proposed human rights treaties.  
See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong (1953). 
 150 See HOLMAN, supra note 34, at 104 (stating that “all lovers of America” should be con-
cerned because “the Amendment is the greatest issue which faces America today, greater than 
taxes or inflation or even Communist infiltration”). 
 151 See Henkin, supra note 57, at 349 (observing that Bricker’s anti–human rights ideology 
infected future treaty law). 
 152 Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and Historical 
Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 433 (2002). 
 153 See id.  See also Brief for Respondents, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2005 WL 2214766, at 
*26 (asserting that self–execution could only be found from “text or drafting and ratification 
history [that] suggest the revolutionary intent to create judicially enforceable rights”) (emphasis 
added). 
 154 See supra notes 51 & 79–82 and accompanying text. 
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III.  MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
While the lower federal courts have been busy expanding the 
self-execution doctrine, the Supreme Court has been relatively reti-
cent on the doctrine, declining to broaden it in a similar manner.155  
Over the last 100 years, many Supreme Court cases have held the trea-
ties at issue self-executing, even allowing for private suits in the ab-
sence of explicit private rights of action.  In the 1924 case, Asakura v. 
City of Seattle, the Court reviewed a suit brought by a pawnbroker of 
Japanese citizenship seeking to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance 
prohibiting Japanese nationals from obtaining business licenses.  Asa-
kura claimed that the ordinance violated a treaty between Japan and 
the United States providing that citizens of each country had the right 
to reside, travel and carry on trade in the other’s territory.156  The Court 
held broadly that the treaty was enforceable as “the supreme law of 
the land” without searching for intent that the parties desired domes-
tic enforceability.157  Moreover, the Court did not question Asakura’s 
ability to sue for injunction directly under the treaty.158  Asakura sup-
ports the principle that a person who has rights under a treaty may sue 
to prevent the government from carrying out policies violating such 
rights.  The Court came to a similar conclusion in Bacardi Corporation 
of America v. Domenech, a 1940 case that sustained the lower court’s 
granting of Bacardi’s request to enjoin a Puerto Rican law that vi-
olated the Pan American Trademark Treaty.159 
In the 1933 case, Cook v. U.S.,160 the Court upheld the domestic 
enforceability of the Convention between the United States and 
Great Britain for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liq-
uors.161  Cook was the owner of a British cargo ship seized en route to 
Nassau by the U.S. Coast Guard beyond the territorial waters of the 
United States.  Finding liquor on Cook’s ship, the government fined 
him $14,286.18 and proceeded with an action to recoup the fine by 
forfeiture of the vessel.162  Cook defended against the forfeiture by 
arguing that the seizure of the ship violated the treaty, which only 
permitted seizures outside of U.S. territorial water if the seizure oc-
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Vázquez, supra note 90, at 722 (noting that Supreme Court “has not said more than 
a sentence or two about the distinction in any case for nearly a century”); Sloss, supra note 39, at 
73 (“[T]he Court has never stated or implied that the treaty makers have the power to counter-
mand the Supremacy Clause”)  (footnote omitted). 
 156 265 U.S. 332 (1924). 
 157 Id. at 341. 
 158 Id. 
 159 311 U.S. 150, 162 (1940). 
 160 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
 161 43 Stat. 1761 (1924) [hereinafter Smuggling Convention]. 
 162 Cook, 288 U.S. at 107–108. 
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curred within an area that “can be traversed in one hour by the vessel 
suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense.”163   
The Court held that the forfeiture action could not be maintained 
because the treaty was self-executing and Cook’s seizure was in viola-
tion of the treaty.164  Interestingly, the Court noted that despite the sei-
zure being warrantless, if the seizure was only domestically unlawful, 
the forfeiture action would have been maintainable.  However, since 
the seizure violated treaty law, the forfeiture action could not stand 
because “[t]o hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure 
would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty.”165  In this 
sense, the Court elevated treaty law over domestic law.  In addition, 
the treaty itself prescribed specific international procedures for vindi-
cating violation claims by British vessels suffering losses.166  The Court 
never entertained the notion that this provision could preclude Cook 
from using the treaty to defend domestically against the forfeiture 
action.167 
There are two other more recent cases of note, in which the Court 
found the relevant treaties self-executing.  In Warren v. U.S., the Court 
was called upon to construe the Ship Owners Liability Convention 
which created general liability for sickness, injuries, and death on 
ships.168  Article 2 of the Convention provided the caveat that “national 
laws or regulations may make exceptions in respect of . . . injury in-
curred otherwise than in the service of the ship.”169  The plaintiff, an 
injured ship employee, argued ship owner liability was not limited by 
Article 2 because the Article was non-self-executing and no legislation 
had been passed implementing it.170  The Court held that despite the 
reference to “national laws or regulations,” domestic implementing 
legislation was not required.  Thus, the provision was self-executing 
and permitted exceptions under “general maritime law.”171   
In the 1984 case, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 
the Court considered whether the Warsaw Convention’s liability limit 
on lost air cargo was modified by the repealing of the federal Par Val-
ue Modification Act.172   In answering that question in the negative, the 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Id. at 108. 
 164 Id. at 119 n.19 & 121–22. 
 165 Id. at 122–23. 
 166 See Smuggling Convention, supra note 162, at art. IV. 
 167 See Cook, 288 U.S. at 119–22. 
 168 340 U.S. 523 (1951). 
 169 Id. at 525 (quoting The Shipowners’ Liability Convention, proclaimed by the President 
Sept. 29, 1939, 54 Stat. 1693, art. 2(2)). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 526. 
 172 466 U.S. 243 (1984). 
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Court observed that the Warsaw Convention was self-executing and 
not dependent on implementing legislation, despite its statement that 
the liability limit “may be converted into any national currency in 
round figures.”173  As a self-executing treaty, it could not be overturned 
by the Par Value Modification Act because the Act did not express a 
clear purpose to abrogate the treaty.174   
Not every Supreme Court case in the last hundred years has 
found the relevant treaty self-executing.  For example, in the 1984 
case, INS v. Stevic, the Court, in dicta, asserted that Article 34 of the 
1968 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
which requires “nations to facilitate the admission of refugees to the 
extent possible,” was non-self-executing175 because it was merely pre-
catory and not intended to change the law.176  This language in Stevic, 
however, is nothing more than the unexceptional claim, introduced in 
Foster, that merely aspirational provisions in treaties do not give rise 
to enforceable rights.177 
More problematic is the Court’s decision in the 1913 case, Came-
ron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville.178  The Court was called upon 
to decide whether the Brussels Industrial Property Convention ex-
tended the term of a U.S. patent.179  Apparently, the main ground for 
answering that question in the negative was that the American dele-
gates to the Brussels Convention did not intend the treaty to enlarge 
patent terms.  This assertion appears quite suspect because the lan-
guage of the treaty unambiguously extended such patent terms, as 
even the Court admitted.  Moreover, the Court’s divined intent of 
American drafters came from negotiation statements ultimately re-
jected prior to the signing of the treaty.180  Notwithstanding the flawed 
interpretive argument, the Court went on to observe that the provi-
sion at issue was not self-executing.  The Court apparently based this 
conclusion, not on whether the drafters intended the treaty to have 
domestic effect, but on the “sense of Congress” after ratification that 
the instrument was non-self-executing.181  Obviously, this is problemat-
                                                                                                                           
 173 Id. at 247 (quoting Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22(4), 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted 
in Note following 49 U.S.C. § 1502). 
 174 Id. 
 175 467 U.S. 407 (1984). 
 176 Id. at 428 n.22. 
 177 This “precatoriness” analysis has also been utilized by lower courts.  See Tel–Oren, 726 
F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619 n.2 (Cal. 1952). Cf. Vázquez, 
supra note 90, at 714 (asserting courts have an obligation to construe vague treaty terms). 
 178 227 U.S. 39 (1913). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 44–49. 
 181 Id. at 49. 
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ic language because it allows the nebulous post-ratification sentiments 
of Congress to defeat the enforceability of a validly ratified treaty.  
Perhaps, the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be explained by the fact 
that courts tend to regard patent law as an exclusive area of congres-
sional prerogative.182  In the end, however, lower courts have not gen-
erally relied on Cameron Septic to bolster the intent doctrine, and the 
case may simply represent an anomaly in Supreme Court self-
execution jurisprudence.183 
Looking at Supreme Court case law on self-execution over the 
last hundred years, one sees a Court neither hostile to treaty enforce-
ment nor determined to find “intent-to-self-execute” as a prerequisite 
to enforcement.  In fact, the Court has permitted the private litigation 
of treaty claims through a variety of mechanisms, without regard to 
whether the treaty provided an explicit private right of action. Justice 
Breyer recently summarized the Court’s treaty precedents as holding: 
(1) [A] treaty obligated the United States to treat foreign 
nationals in a certain manner; (2) the obligation had been 
breached by the Government’s conduct; and (3) the for-
eign national could therefore seek redress for that breach 
in a judicial proceeding, even though the treaty did not 
specifically mention judicial enforcement of its guarantees 
or even expressly state that its provisions were intended to 
confer rights on the foreign national.184 
Consequently, it is fairly evident that the new anti-international self-
execution rules were nearly exclusively a creation of lower courts.  In 
the last several years, the topic of hostility to treaty law has filtered 
out of the courts and become more than merely a topic for academic 
rumination.  As soon as the Guantánamo detentions came to light, the 
Geneva Conventions became the topic of popular discussion.185  Presi-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See, e.g., Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500–01 (4th Cir. 1929) (creating 
special rule for enforceability of patent treaties). 
 183 A Westlaw keycite search reveals only two non–patent cases that cite Cameron Septic.  
The Florida case, Milliken v. State, 131 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1961), cites Cameron Septic only for 
the general proposition that “a treaty provision will not operate to supersede or suspend a state 
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 184 Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2696 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See 
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ident’s legal advisers take broad views of the independent presidential power to combat terror-
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dent Bush quickly set forth the conclusory legal claim that the Geneva 
Conventions are non-self-executing,186 and in the world opinion, the 
United States became synonymous with disrespect for treaty law.187 
Eventually, two terrorism cases made their way through the lower 
courts challenging President Bush’s program of military detention and 
trial for terrorism suspects.  In Hamdi, an American citizen designated 
as an enemy combatant challenged his classification and continued 
military detention as, among other things, in violation of the Geneva 
Conventions.188  In Hamdan, a foreign national and Guantánamo de-
tainee sought to have the Supreme Court declare President’s Bush’s 
military tribunals illegal, asserting they violated domestic law and the 
Geneva Conventions.189  The federal courts of appeals’ analyses of the 
detainees’ Geneva Convention claims reflect unequivocally a fervent 
embrace of the modern anti-internationalist approach to treaty self-
execution. 
In Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed Hamdi’s Ge-
neva claims on the ground that the Conventions neither contain an 
explicit private right of action, nor otherwise evidence intent to pro-
vide one.
 190  Yet Hamdi had asserted the federal habeas corpus statute, 
which allows a litigant to challenge custody in violation of the laws 
and treaties of the United States, provided him a legal mechanism for 
suit.191  To this, the Fourth Circuit responded categorically that the trea-
ty could not be enforced through any domestic legal mechanism be-
cause it was intended to be vindicated only through international pro-
                                                                                                                           
Spectar, Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law & the Use of Force in 
the Long Hard Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 47, 117 (2006) (“Non–governmental organizations 
around the world have played a critical role in critiquing Bush Administration policies on the 
treatment of detainees.”). 
 186 See Dep’t of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 19 
(Mar. 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2.pdf. 
 187 See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 653 (2006) (noting that Bush’s policies are “widely viewed as a 
blatant disregard of basic principles of the laws of war and human rights law.”).  See, e.g.,
 
Ams-
terdam, supra note 20, at 415 (“If the dumb fiasco of the lawless mass detention of suspected 
terrorist operatives at Guantánamo Bay by the current administration has had any positive 
consequence at all, it is that the world–wide outcry of repugnance for this cowboy adventure into 
totalitarianism has reminded us that other nations around the globe have much to teach us about 
respect for liberty and its protection by the rule of law.”). 
 188 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
 189 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762 (2006).   
 190 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468.  
 191 Id.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (habeas statute).  The Court had already resolved in Rasul 
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004), that non–citizen detainees at Guantánamo have the right to 
challenge detention under the habeas statute.  The Rasul decision also states that the Guantána-
mo detainees’ claims “unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States.’”  Id. at 483 & n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). 
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cedures.192  Here, the court assumed, without explanation, that the exis-
tence of some international procedure provisions within the Conven-
tions necessarily precluded domestic enforcement.193  In the end, the 
court’s main legal stance was to mistake the question of self-execution 
with the question of justiciability,194 and find the Geneva Conventions 
unenforceable merely for lack of an internal private right of action.  
The D.C. Circuit in Hamdan did much better on this issue, recognizing, 
“The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on 
a private right of action.”195  
In other respects, however, the decision of the D.C. Circuit in 
Hamdan elevates treaty law antipathy to new heights.  The D.C. Cir-
cuit openly reversed the presumption that treaties are the supreme 
law of the land, through a patent misapplication, bordering on bad 
faith, of the holding in the Head Money Cases.196  The court of appeals 
quoted Head Money for the proposition that “[a]s a general matter, a 
‘treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations,’ and ‘de-
pends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor 
of the governments which are parties to it.’”197  Yet conspicuously ab-
sent from the D.C. Circuit’s holding is the portion of Head Money that 
states that a treaty may “prescribe a rule by which the rights of the 
private citizen or subject may be determined,” and a “court resorts to 
the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a 
statute.”198   
The selective quotation of Head Money to create a presumption 
that treaties can only be enforced through international procedures is 
plainly unjustified.  Relying on its created presumption that treaties 
do not affect individuals, the court of appeals did not bother to discuss 
the fact that the Geneva Conventions clearly obligate signatories to 
treat individual captures in a specific manner.199  Rather, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468. 
 193 See Sloss, supra note 139, at 96 (noting the “numerous cases in which the Supreme Court 
has approved domestic judicial enforcement of a treaty that was silent with respect to domestic 
judicial enforcement, but provided expressly for international dispute resolution”) & n.395 (cit-
ing cases). 
 194 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 195 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 196 See John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty–Based 
Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 552 (2006) (calling court of appeals’ selective reading of Head 
Money “misleading”). 
 197 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598). 
 198 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598–99. 
 199 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 15, arts. 13, 15, 18, 22, & 25–31; see David 
L. Sloss, International Decision: Rasul v. Bush, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 788, 797–98 (2004) (contending 
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dismissed any domestic enforceability argument on the inapposite 
ground that Geneva contains provisions setting forth international 
procedures to resolve claims by signatories against fellow signatories.200  
However, this is clearly neither the principle set forth in Head Money, 
nor one from any other Supreme Court case.  Head Money makes 
clear that so long as the Geneva Conventions create rights “of a na-
ture to be enforced in a court of justice,” they are so enforceable.201  
The existence of international procedures does not control the ques-
tion. 
Lurking within the courts of appeals’ analyses is the modern in-
tent thesis.  The courts interpret the existence of international proce-
dures as an indication that treaty makers intended for the Geneva 
Conventions to be non-self-executing.  The D.C Circuit in Hamdan 
asserts that it is constrained to this analysis by a footnote in the Su-
preme Court decision in the World War II case Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
which states, “It is . . .  the obvious scheme of the [Geneva Conven-
tions] that responsibility for observance and enforcement of these 
rights is upon political and military authorities.”202  The Eisentrager 
opinion, however, substantively resolved the treaty claims at issue, and 
the dicta on which the D.C. Circuit relies is unexplained and troub-
ling.203  The provisions for international procedures in the Geneva 
Conventions regard disputes between nations over treaty interpreta-
tion and inter-sovereign allegations of violations.204  The Conventions 
simply do not say one way or another how individual claims should be 
processed.  There is plainly no language in the treaty indicating that 
the rights set forth are not domestically enforceable.205   
Moreover, there is a good explanation for why the Conventions 
would remain silent about domestic enforcement mechanisms - the 
signatories had differing legal systems and varied approaches to do-
mestic treaty enforcement.206  This does not mean, however, that the 
Convention negotiators intended to preclude domestic enforcement in 
every signatory country.207  Consequently, the existence of international 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38. 
 201 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598. 
 202 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950)). 
 203 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 790.  See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793 (noting that Eisentrager 
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procedures does not demonstrate, as a matter of plain language or 
drafter intent, that domestic enforceability is precluded.  Moreover, 
such a conclusion appears unequivocally at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Cook.208 
In Hamdi and Hamdan, the Supreme Court had the opportunity 
to reaffirm the supreme status of treaty law, clarify the distinction be-
tween self-execution and justiciability, and send a message to the 
world that the United States does take international law seriously.209  
Unfortunately, the Court took pains to avoid these issues, finding by 
hook or crook, only domestic remedies for the detainees.  Internation-
al law played a small but interesting role in Hamdi.  Writing for the 
plurality, Justice O’Connor held that President Bush’s military deten-
tion of alleged enemy combatants, including citizens, had been autho-
rized by Congress’ Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), which simply provides that “the President is autho-
rized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001.”210   
Although the AUMF says absolutely nothing about military deten-
tion of citizens, the Court concluded that such action was part of using 
“necessary and appropriate” military force.211  As support, the Court 
looked to law of war treatises, previous cases, and international instru-
ments, including the Geneva Conventions.212  Thus, the Geneva Conven-
tions were used, not to limit the President’s use of war power, but to 
help justify it.213  Hamdi only limits Presidential discretion by requiring 
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that the procedure used to classify citizens as enemy combatants com-
plies with constitutional due process.214  The Court determined the 
process due to Hamdi by applying the test from Matthews v. Eldridge, a 
case involving social security benefits.215  Having laid out the process due 
to Hamdi under the Matthews test, the Court summarily declared that it 
need not determine “whether any treaty guarantees him similar access 
to a tribunal for a determination of his status.”216 
The Court, however, never entertained the notion that the Con-
ventions might provide procedures different from those laid out by 
the Court.217  In addition, conspicuously absent is any mention of the 
Geneva Conventions’ prescribed conditions of detention, other than 
access to a tribunal.218  It is quite clear that the President’s treatment of 
Hamdi did not comply with the prisoner of war conditions required by 
the Geneva Conventions.219  Because Hamdi had challenged the legali-
ty of his detention, the Court had an obligation to resolve whether or 
not the Geneva Conventions applied to him and rendered his deten-
tion illegal.220  Moreover, the Court ignored the probability that the 
“law of nations,” on which it relied in interpreting the AUMF, does 
not consider detention in violation of Geneva’s dictates to be “neces-
sary and appropriate.”  The Court likely ignored this point because it 
might have led to a finding that Congress had not authorized Hamdi’s 
detention.221  O’Connor’s conclusion that Congress had authorized the 
President’s detention program was what allowed her to steer clear of 
the thorny issue of executive unilateralism.  Consequently, the Court 
managed to avoid the self-execution issue, and all substantive interna-
                                                                                                                           
the law of war to avoid prosecuting terrorist suspects in civilian courts, while ignoring the limits 
that the law of war imposes on the detention, treatment, and trial of prisoners.”  Jonathan Ha-
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 214 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536–39.   
 215 Id. at 528 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
 216 Id. at 534 n.2. 
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tional law claims, even though a discussion of the Geneva Conven-
tions’ status and provisions was clearly warranted. 
By contrast, in Hamdan, the Supreme Court did undertake an ex-
tensive discussion of the Geneva Conventions, finding the military 
trial procedures unlawful as violative of Geneva Common Article 3, 
which requires military tribunals to be “regularly constituted court[s], 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples.”222  In doing so, the Court adopted an 
internationalist interpretation of Common Article 3, contrary to the 
one proffered by the President.223  Amazingly, the Court was able to 
reach the conclusion that Common Article 3 rendered the tribunals 
unlawful without touching the issue of Geneva self-execution.  In or-
der to do so, the Court had to engage in an exercise of incredibly bold 
legislative interpretation, reading the Geneva Conventions into the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).224  The Court’s basic argu-
ment was that the UCMJ requires the procedures used to try detai-
nees like Hamdan to comply with the “law of war,” including the Ge-
neva Conventions, and the President’s procedures did not so comply 
because of their failure to comport with Common Article 3.225 
The Court held that Article 21 of the UCMJ acted as implicit 
congressional authorization, with limitations, of the President’s power 
to establish and employ military commissions to try enemy comba-
tants.226  Article 21 reads:  
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon 
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, prov-
ost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent juris-
diction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute 
                                                                                                                           
 222 The Court opines, “Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, 
falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a 
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or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, 
provost courts, or other military tribunals.227   
The Court interprets this sentence as an authorization of the President 
to use military commissions with the qualification that such commis-
sions comport with “the law of war.”228   
This interpretation of Article 21 is quite problematic, and to be 
sure, it incurred the wrath of conservative members of the Court.229  
Experts are in fair agreement that Article 21 was not meant to author-
ize or limit the President’s common law authority to establish military 
commissions during wartime.230  Rather, Article 21 represents Con-
gress’ desire that the UCMJ’s establishment of court martial proce-
dures leave unchanged whatever common law power the President 
already had to try enemies for statutory violations or war crimes.231 
There are additional problems with the Court’s interpretation of 
Article 21.  Even if Article 21 does operate to limit the President’s 
military commission authority, a plain reading reveals that it only lim-
its the kind of offenses that may be tried - statutory or law of war of-
fenses - not the procedures that may be used.232  As much was recog-
nized by the Court in the World War II case In re Yamashita, when it 
stated that Article 21 “left the control over the procedure . . . where it 
previously had been, with the military command.”233  Finally, the as-
sumption that the UCMJ meant to incorporate Geneva procedural 
rights seems unsupported by the history of the Code.234   
Consequently, by bringing Geneva into the Hamdan case solely 
through the domestic UCMJ, the Court was able to scrupulously avoid 
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Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529, 535 (2005). 
 232 The Article preserves jurisdiction with respect to “offenders or offenses that by statute 
or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military 
tribunals.” 10 U.S.C. § 821.  It does not state that the procedures of such military commissions, 
provost courts, or military tribunals must comply with the law of war. 
 233 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946).   
 234 See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text. 
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the self-execution issue.  The questionable nature of the Court’s legis-
lative interpretation shows the length to which the Court was willing 
to go to avoid the self-execution question.  Perhaps, the Court’s me-
thodology can be understood as mere judicial restraint.  However, the 
Court clearly believed the Bush administration was violating interna-
tional law.235  Placing the fate of the Geneva Conventions in Congress’s 
hands, especially when the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which 
approves the President’s (illegal) interpretation of Geneva,
 236 was 
about to be enacted, cannot be rationalized as mere judicial modera-
tion.  Jordan J. Paust criticizes the Court’s approach: 
This roundabout use of the laws of war may seem appro-
priate in terms of normal judicial caution, but when a judge 
realizes that every violation of the laws of war is a war 
crime and war crime activity by the Executive against a 
habeas petitioner who is before the Court is apparent, such 
caution in the face of international crime is less than satis-
fying. The Court should have mandated that the Executive 
comply with particular laws of war when it was apparent 
that they were being violated.237 
Moreover, declaring the Conventions self-executing would have 
bolstered the United States’ credibility as a defender of human 
rights.238  Thus, the Supreme Court’s avoidance of self-execution can-
not be understood as mere accident or cautious temperance.  The 
Court’s jurisprudential choices reveal that it had internalized the view, 
created by isolationist lower court activism, that treaty self-execution 
is illegitimate.  The Court’s avoidance evidences that it believed dec-
laring a humanitarian treaty like the Geneva Conventions self-
executing would have been too ambitious, liberal, or difficult.   
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has sought to demonstrate that the development of a 
new isolationist approach to self-execution is a barrier to true interna-
                                                                                                                           
 235 See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text (Court’s Common Article 3 analysis). 
 236 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); codified at 10 
U.S.C. § 948(a) et seq.  Section 6(a)(3)(A) provides that “the President has the authority for the 
United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions.”  The Act 
appears to set forth procedures for military commissions that are not commensurate with UCMJ 
procedures, which, according to the Court, violates Common Article 3.  See Aya Gruber, Who’s 
Afraid of Geneva Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.  1017 (2007). 
 237 Paust, supra note 4, at 841 (footnote omitted). 
 238 Academics note, “The perception of the United States as a human rights leader has been 
ruined.”  Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter Terrorism, 36 CAL. W. INT’L 
L.J. 249, 292 (2006). 
2007] Sending the Self–Execution Doctrine to the Executioner 95 
tionalism in American law.  Over the past few decades, lower courts 
have actively expanded the self-execution barrier to treaty law, there-
by rendering ineffective older treaties and providing the U.S. govern-
ment a mechanism to avoid human rights and humanitarian obliga-
tions in new treaties.  Meanwhile, the Court has largely sat by passive-
ly, allowing lower courts to chip away systematically at the letter and 
spirit of the Supremacy Clause.  Today, however, the Court’s avoid-
ance and passivity on the self-execution issues is more than just 
grounds for academic dissatisfaction.  In the midst of the “war on ter-
ror,” the status of human rights and humanitarian treaties is of dire 
import.  The United States has become synonymous with international 
law violations, and President Bush continues to flout the letter and 
spirit of the Geneva Conventions by his treatment of the Guantánamo 
detainees.  Yet all is not lost.  As the Guantánamo detainees’ cases 
make their way up through the lower courts, now challenging deten-
tion under the newly-passed Military Commissions Act, the Supreme 
Court may yet have another chance to declare the Geneva Conven-
tions self-executing and affirm that treaties are the supreme law of the 
land. 
 
